New Delhi
21 May 2008
Book Review of Bill Emmott's "Rivals: How the power struggle between China, India and
Japan will shape our next decade"
past, examines the present, and delves into the future of India, China and Japan as they
chart their destinies, individually and collectively. Emmott, admittedly writing from a
Western perspective, believes power struggle between India, China and Japan is
inevitable, and perhaps imminent. He is certain the relationship between India, China
and Japan is going to become increasingly difficult during the next decade or more
although he adds a caveat that the three countries are not destined for conflict. "Conflict
is not inevitable but nor is it inconceivable," is how he puts it. Emmott quotes an Indian
diplomat to illustrate his point. "Both India and China think that the future belongs to us.
We can't both be right," the diplomat tells Emmott. On the other hand, he thinks China
will find it increasingly difficult to disguise its ambition and hide its claws, or as Deng
Xiaoping recommended, to keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. "The most basic
point is that even without overt hostility the politicians and strategic planners of all threecountries will feel obliged, by their sense of national responsibility and of historic
opportunity, to compete for advantage, to prepare for the worst, to build alliances and
networks against each other -- just in case circumstances change," he says. That apart,
the rivalry or struggle for power between India, China and Japan will also be a function of
how certain other dramatis personae choose to act or not act. According to Emmott, the
two "giant onlookers" -- the United States and Russia -- will be seeking to influence the
three countries, which will in more ways than one shape the Asian drama. He refers
America's dramatic opening of relations with China in 1971-72 and America's decision in
2005 to go in for a nuclear deal with India, to suggest the US is back to playing Asia's
new power game. "Where Nixon had used China to balance the (erstwhile) Soviet Union,Bush was using India to balance China," he says.
Emmott's "Rivals" is also unique, in that it opts for an immediate horizon than crystal-
ball gazing to forecast distant prospects. Unlike the boldness of Goldman Sachs in
producing forecasts reaching as far ahead as 2050, Emmott chooses to focus on the next
10. He takes a more immediate view of the likely shifts in the geopolitical landscape,
and with good reason too. There are too many uncertainties over even a few years let
alone over four decades or more; therefore, the focus is on what Asia might look like in
2020, which, by the way, is only less than 12 years away. And for one who has written
six books on Japan, he only knows too well how interruptions and discontinuities, such
as that experienced by Japan since its financial crash in 1990, can throw out the most
well-meaning and most soundly based of long-range predictions. Emmott has anotherexplanation: Rather than projecting ahead to see what might be the raw economic
rankings between the nations in 2020 or 2050, the more important question to ask is how
will the changes inherent in pursuit of economic growth likely to impact on the country's
relations with its neighbours, with others in Asia, on regional politics and economics as
a whole, and on the rest of the world? "Those reactions are what this book will attempt to
chart and, to a degree, predict," Emmott sets out at the beginning of this book.
Emmott proceeds from the premise that Asia is not a single entity, that Asia is divided.
According to him, Asia has been not so much a continent as an array of subcontinents or
subregions. "It has no clear boundaries, no obvious beginning, middle or end, and no
obvious divisions according even to the points of the compass." Also, Asia has neverhad a single dominant religion to serve as a unifier in the European manner. If Asia is
unified by religion it is by religious tolerance, which, he says, "is an admirable
characteristic but it is not a unifying one." Again, Asia has little of something Europe now
has in abundance: unifying regional institutions. "The things that divide Asia's great
powers from one another currently far outweigh those that unite them," he concludes.
So how are those divisions playing themselves out? Emmott begins by suggesting
Japan, China and India are increasingly looking like actual or potential impediments to
each other, before going on to draw a parallel of 19th century Europe when France,
Britain and Germany vied for supremacy. He says Asia is becoming an arena of balance
of power politics, with no clear leader, rather as Europe was during the `9th century. "A
new power game is under way, in which all must seek to be as friendly as possible toall, for fear of the consequences if they are not, but in which the friendship is only skin-
deep. All are manoeuvring to strengthen their own positions and maximise their own
long term advantages." He is equally certain China will emerge as the most powerful of
the three, but like Britain in the 19th century it is unlikely to be capable of dominating its
continent.
Emmott goes on to cite certain instances to suggest the rivalry is already shaping what
happens. He asks: Why did Japan make India its largest recipient of overseas aid,
beginning in 2004? (Incidentally, 2004 saw Japan for the first time mention China and
North Korea as the main potential threats to Japanese security.) Why, in 2005, did other
Asian countries push for India to be included in the East Asian Summit? And, why in the
middle of 2007, did neither India nor China join the widespread internationalcondemnation of the military regime in Burma? The rivalry also can be seen in the
manner China reaches across to Africa through the Indian Ocean for resources and India
reaches across to East Asia, through the Malacca Strait between Indonesia and
Malaysia, for markets and commercial partners. "Asia is going to be full of disruptive
transformations ... As India and China grow, their economic and political interests are
going to overlap more and more," he asserts.
Emmott would like to believe a conflict could break out very suddenly; either through a
miscalculation by one of the powers, or through an accident, probably an event in one of
the region's smaller countries, that either provokes one or more of the big powers to get
involved militarily or else tempts them by offering an opportunity, in a move that then
draws others in. Asia, he says, is already a heavily militarised continent; it is home to
four of the world's eight declared nuclear power states and five of the world's 10 biggestarmies. The most likely flashpoints or triggers could be: The Sino-Indian border and
Tibet; Korea; the East China Sea and the Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands; Taiwan; and
Pakistan. Not necessarily in that order, as he soon explains. "Pakistan is the likeliest of
the five to see sparks fly, because it is a sparky sort of place," Emmott writes. Tibet, in
turn, can become a flashpoint if unrest breaks out after a "probable" dispute over the
Dalai Lama's successor. In such a situation, India might feel obliged to do something,
which, Emmott is categorical, is "unlikely." The other risk is that either China or India
might decide to send military force into the disputed border areas. "If any of these
events occurs, the stakes would be high."
Emmott goes on to make nine recommendations, including one for US President George
Bush's successor. "For Bush, helping India and getting it on America's side was ahigher priority than reforming and modernising the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty). For his successor, the non-proliferation regime itself needs to be a priority ....
The new US President must think and act for the longer term. They should seek ways to
bring the world's nuclear weapons powers back to the negotiating table in order to agree
upon a new NPT." Among the other recommendations are to include India and China in
the Group of Eight (G-8) and to strengthen the East Asian Summit.
If Emmott is close to resembling, in some ways, what Fareed Zakaria writes in his book
"The Post-American World", or when Richard Haass writes about "The Age of
nonpolarity: What will follow US dominance" in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, or
even Kishore Mahbubani's "The New Asian Hemisphere", is that Asia is getting richerand stronger and it will change the relative balance of power in the world. Neither
America nor Europe will be able to dominate world affairs in the manner to which they
have become accustomed.
Emmott, who was editor of the "Economist" from 1993 to 2006, is most comfortable when
he is looking through an economic prism, comparing the respective economic strengths
and handicaps of the three countries. His strength is a handicap in certain ways; he does
not quite get around to explaining how the foreign policies of India, China and Japan will
shape up, or how they will impact the region and the world. Also, he does not delve
deeper into how extra-regional actors, including US or Russia, might influence the
course of events in Asia or even how shifts in military power will affect future conflicts or
on some of the present crises in other parts of Asia. Emmott leaves readers with twodifferent images of how Asia might look in 2020: a plausibly pessimistic view and a
credibly optimistic view. To be sure, he acknowledges, in economics and business the
competition will have overwhelmingly positive results but in politics, one can't be sure.
Q & A with Bill Emmott
On rivalry between India, China and Japan
The relations between China and India, and China and Japan, have been beset by mutual
suspicion but it does not inevitably mean conflict. There is no strategic intent to be
confrontational but inherited insecurities, build-up of militaries, resources ... all could be
likely trigger. Lack of good communication coupled with few pan-Asian institutions,
besides the East Asian Summit, can be worrisome, too.
On India-Japan relations
The Indo-Japanese bilateral relations was marked by indifference but the elites of India
and Japan are showing more interest in cooperating with each other because of China.
India receives a quarter of all Japanese overseas aid, which is an important
consideration.
On the economic ties among the three countries
There is a limit to how trade ties between India and China, or China and Japan, but there
is no limit to trade and economic ties between India and Japan. The Indo-Japanese
economic ties will get stronger but there is no formal alliance developing.
On the next decade
There will be potential for innate rivalry because of flashpoints in the region. India is
becoming a priority state and the United States will want to strengthen its relationship
with India because of the rise of China. Japan will remain a major player because of its
ties with the US.
On the three countries and the US
I am optimistic about the US. Its is going through a bad period economically but it will
bounce back. Its influence will also revive and its reputation as an indispensable nation,
as some would suggest, will remain.
China is reaching where Japan was in the 1960s. It has an investment-led growth, which,
in turn, is essentially driven by cheap labour. It is assisted in some ways by disregard
for environment.
India is where China was in the mid-1990s. Investments have shot up. There is more
capital available. Infrastructure is driving the Indian economy.
Japan will face a tough time in the near term because its politics is paralysed. One could
see political realignment.
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