MK Bhadrakumar
a former Indian diplomat
New Delhi
27 February 2011
MK Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat with considerable experience of West Asia, says an era is ending in West Asia and it is necessary for India to be on the right side of history. Here are excerpts from his interview with Ramesh Ramachandran:
Given the fact that India has millions of its citizens living and working abroad, particularly in the Gulf and the Maghreb countries, do you think the Indian Government has a workable evacuation plan in place when situations like this erupt?
Even if we had an evacuation plan it would have gathered dust, and its relevance to the actual ground situation would be questionable because there is nothing like an ideal evacuation plan. In a broader context, we could have imagined that West Asia and the Persian Gulf inherently is an unstable region and that there was a kind of a crisis brewing, because even former US president George W Bush had spoken of a new Middle-East. But, even as of today, no one can tell what forms the unrest is going to take. Definitely there is an Arab revolt in the sense of a certain awakening, a certain surge of popular aspirations and hopes for a different kind of political system, regional environment and governance. This will take different forms in different countries. In Egypt and Tunisia the old regimes made an exit with some grace, and there was no bloodshed. But, in Libya, it has taken a different form. Again, in Bahrain, where the regime is spoken of as being headed by a relatively young, Western-educated, forward-looking, modern and progressive monarch, one sudden unexpected outburst of violence disproved all those theories about him. So how different regimes are going to react, and in what form these developments unfold, is going to have a bearing on evacuation plan. In some cases evacuation is not necessary, like in Egypt. In the case of Libya, the Western oil companies operating there had contingency pans but now suddenly they have realised that those plans have absolutely no relation to the kind of ground situation developing because Libya has shown tendencies towards a fragmentation between east and west and on tribal lines, which, I don't think many people anticipated. If the central authority collapses, it could cause anarchy, then who you relate to? This kind of problem arises. So at the end of the day I would not put blame on the Government of India if it lacks one. I would not put blame on Government of India also if its contingency plan, if there is indeed one, is not found to be suitable to the ground situation.
India is being criticised by critics as not being vocal enough in openly slamming the regimes of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain. There is another view that India cannot be too harsh on some of these regimes in the Arab world as the livelihoods of Indians who live in those countries is at stake. Also, India sources most of its oil and gas from the Arab world. Do you think India has been right to be so cautious?
India is being criticised by critics as not being vocal enough in openly slamming the regimes of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain. There is another view that India cannot be too harsh on some of these regimes in the Arab world as the livelihoods of Indians who live in those countries is at stake. Also, India sources most of its oil and gas from the Arab world. Do you think India has been right to be so cautious?
I think one era has ended, and it is necessary for us to take a progressive view, and to be on the right side of history. Most certainly the initial reaction to the Egyptian situation was over-cautious to the point of being timid. But then we corrected ourselves and the external affairs minister salvaged the situation. Now we have spoken about Libya, and I have noticed that we have spoken in a strong language. I can put it in a context because India would have had to take a position in the United Nations Security Council where this matter has reached, so maybe that is the compulsion under which India has spoken. But, I would have liked India to take a stance on this. India does not have a position even today in the sense that, does it see the writing on the wall of history at all? Does it think that this is something that will fizzle out and the ancient regimes will continue and it will be business as usual? Or is it that we will only follow the West's footsteps? Obama said harsh things about Libya, and Western policy became very tough, and so India spoke out. But violence was let loose in Bahrain, where half the population of Bahrain is Indian and half of it actually from Kerala, and we didn't say anything. Frankly speaking, I have no idea whether we really have a big picture in mind. And it is very important that we have one. This is not a situation where you think in terms of evacuation, a few hundred thousand barrels of oil, and so on. We have to look at it in terms of the forces of history, in terms of the new forces that will emerge in the region and what their expectations will be, and whether we are acclimatising ourselves with these winds of change. Unfortunately, I don't see that happening in Delhi.
Does our West Asia policy need a complete overhaul?
Neither the Gulf countries nor the rest of the Arab world have paid India much attention post-Jawaharlal Nehru and even less so post-Indira Gandhi. Pakistan has successfully sold the Arab countries the lollipop that India's policies in Jammu and Kashmir are anti-Muslim. The only reason that the Gulf countries have reached out to India is because of the marked US tilt towards India as evidenced by the nuclear deal, and that India is a growing economy that can no longer be ignored. Our pro-Palestine policy, which could have won them over, was limited to the Indira-Arafat hug! Is it not time we crafted a credible West Asia policy, and what should it be? We can best approach it in terms of the problem areas. Let me first speak of the positive aspects. It is a region inhabited by people who are on the whole favourably disposed towards of us. I can't see them being swayed by Pakistan against India. Clearly there is no historical backlog we are carrying; we've never been an invader; we've never been prescriptive; we've never been exploitative; and I think the Indian expat community has acquitted itself well, by and large. Also, there is a fair awareness in the region that India is an emerging power, and it is useful from their point of view to have a good relationship with India. Now, to speak of the problem areas, I think in the recent past our West Asia policy underwent a big shift towards stengthening relations with those regimes which were pro-West. To illustrate my point, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, but he is adamant in his refusal to visit Iran. So, India is consciously looking for tie-ups, alliances and strategic understandings with pro-Western regimes in the region. It is no secret, and it has not gone unnoticed in the region. The Iranians and others know that this is the general Indian disposition. So, if tomorrow these regimes get replaced and a representative rule comes, I'm not going to say that they will be anti-West, but they won't be pro-West either. The successor regimes will definitely reflect the popular opinions on regional and international issues. For example, I think they will take a more genuine position on the Arab-Israel and Israel-Palestine issues. Broadly, all Arab regimes are supportive of the Palestinian cause verbally, but there's been a lot of doublespeak; now that doublespeak will not happen. Secondly, there are strong feelings about seamless US support for Israel, about Israeli belligerence, about arbitrary fashion in which regardless of international law Israel acted in what it considered to be its best interests and insisted that the Arab world accepted it, all on the basis of an unassailable military superiority thanks to very generous US military and financial help. There is also the issue of overall US military presence in the region. Even if new regimes are not going to be anti-US or anti-West, these are templates, and we will see a lot of dynamism on these templates. So India's problem would be where India is spotted. Now, one major problem for India would undoubtedly be its relationship with Israel. On the Arab street they are astonished and bewildered why India should do this. Their concept of India is different from their concept of Israel and so they think, what has India got to learn from Israel in terms of security cooperation? I have talked to Palestinians who visited Delhi, who said that Indian security people have been seen in Israeli prisons where Palestinians are interned to learn "efficient interrogation methods". This does not cast us in a positive light. In 2008, we had the Israeli army chief coming here and for no consumable reason we took him to Jammu and Kashmir. Now, linking Israel with the situation in Jammu and Kashmir was in my opinion downright stupid. Why this was done, and for what tangential gains, I can't understand. Hacing said that, I don't know how India can roll back its ties with Israel because there is a big military relationship and vested interests have accummulated on both sides, including in our security and defence establishments. A third problem area for India is the way we allowed our relationship with Iran to be degraded. The sum total of the developments in West Asia, in geopolitical terms, is that Iran's rise has become unstoppable and US policy to contain Iran is completely unravelling. There is no way the US can put together a phalanx of Arab regimes to put a quarantine around Iran. It's not going to be possible, and therefore if there are regime changes in places such as Bahrain, and its shadow falls on other countries where there are Shi'ite populations such as in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, then the Shi'ite empowerment would mean Iran's leadership role becomes even more pronounced. There's an interesting detail: in 2010, Europe's imports of oil from Iran actually increased by 37 per cent, so it's a very substantial source of oil for Europe; therefore Iran can't be easily touched. This is something which we could have easily foreseen; that it is a genuine regional power and containing such a regional power is against the grain of history, and political realism should have demanded that we kept our relationship with Iran going. This is not the first time we came across American or Israeli pressure but we have behaved in such a supine way that we have found it difficult to handle relations with Iran. American armtwisting has always been a fact of life -- from Indira to Rajiv to Rao they all faced it, but the government of today has chickened out.
In your assessment, how far-reaching are the Arab uprisings; which countries are vulnerable and why?
There is no carbon copy; in different countries it will change in terms of circumstances, but broadly it is clear that the faultlines are Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan and it can spill over into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This is the kind of pattern one can see. But the West will not easily allow the regimes to go away because the West sells arms to them and there are financial stakes, too. Bahrain has majority Shia population but it has a Sunni ruler. Change is inevitable there, but the Americans are trying to establish a dialogue with the Shia forces, and it is trying to put the revolution in slow motion in Bahrain so that when tomorrow dawns, they are on talking terms. Shia empowement will cast its shadow on Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait, which have got sizeable Shia populations. The eastern regions of Saudi Arabia which are Shia dominated are also the oil-rich regions, so the struggle is going to be I think quite violent. Saudi Arabia is an arbitrarily put together country. Unfortunately the propensity will be to use violence of a very extreme kind like in Libya, but, unlike in Libya, the West may acquiesece with it. So these are things which we can very well anticipate. It is not going to be an overnight explosion in Saudi Arabia; I think it will simmer for some time because there is no unified opposition. Over a period of time these things may gain traction. So the Saudi leadership has got some time available to it for reform. Whether it is capable or willing is a different matter. What complicates the situation is that all this is unfolding on the regional landscape at a time when Saudi Arabia is in the midst of political transition. King Abdullah is not going to be hold the levers of power for ever; he is 86 and terminally ill. Crown Prince is battling cancer. The next in line, Prince Nayef (76) is notionally in charge when King Abdullah travels abroad for medical treatment, but he's also ill; therefore the actual power lies with his son, the interior minister, who is regarded as the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia. There is going to be a power struggle within the royal family and possibility of a coup is possible from within the royal family, not in terms of the line of succession but in terms of faction or clique or family branch that is able to muster power. So there are question marks. Incidentally, 22 per cent of Saudi population is below its poverty level. Also, unemployment is close to 20 per cent. And the Shi'ite population is not only persecuted politically but lives in an economically backward area. So there is a class dimension to it, too. The government in Lebanon more or less enjoys legitimacy. Similarly, I don't see colour revolution breaking out in Iran,despite the propaganda. I don't see a problem in Iraq either. Yes, to some extent, there has to be a question mark over Syria. So I would probaly delist Iraq, Iran and Lebanon. For the rest it may be a matter of one month or one year. Some may be bloody, some may be peaceful.
The US seems to be backing all the uprisings in West Asia, but its critics say that Washington, in its blind backing of the toppling of autocrats, has not fully realised the implications of the unrest. Many of the regimes under threat have stood as the Sunni bulwark against the Iran-backed Shia arc of Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Palestine. Should India follow suit, or should it -- in private -- build bridges with the new forces?
Of course, it goes without saying. It is quite clear that whatever changes take place in the region, the Indian expat work force will continue to be of interest and use to them. So India should try to build bridges with the new forces that are emerging and ensure that our interests are secured. Then, we should factor in the popular opinion in the region about Israel. And, in the quickest possible way we should rebuild our relations with Iran. So a course correction is definitely required on our part.
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