New Delhi
18 December 2010
Tibet in the India - China joint statement is anything more than
procedural, says Ambassador TCA Rangachari (Retd), who had dealt with
East Asia in the Ministry of External Affairs for several years. He
also served as India's ambassador to Germany and France. In an
interview to Ramesh Ramachandran, he says it would be premature to talk
of a change in India's position on Tibet. "Maybe there needs to be a
public debate on what is advantageous or disadvantageous from India’s
point of view but we should use whatever leverage we may have earned as
a result of this to see whether we can get a satisfactory resolution of
the issue which has triggered it, which is the issue of stapled visa,"
he says. Excerpts:
Ambassador TCA Rangachari (Retd)
What are some of India’s core concerns and has China shown a
willingness to be sensitive to them?
The term core concern is more a Chinese phrase but it actually sums up
the sentiment quite well, so there is no harm in using that phrase. The
Chinese need to look at those areas which are of interest and
sensitivity to us. Let’s take territorial integrity: that includes J&K
and Arunachal Pradesh. Aksai Chin should also come in the ambit of
territorial integrity. The Chinese have certain claims there. On J&K
the Chinese position has changed in the last 60 years depending on the
state of the India – China relations. On J&K, there is no give on the
Indian side as far as China is concerned. J&K is an integral part of
India; even PoK is part of J&K which is an integral part of India. In
that sense, the Chinese are really not taking into account a very key
concept; territorial integrity is one of the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence or Panchsheel. Therefore India can legitimately
feel a sense of grievance that when it comes to something as important
as J&K, the Chinese have not been as forthcoming as India has been over
the years in regard to Tibet, Taiwan, one-China, etc. Terrorism is
another issue that is dominant in the public mind. It is well
established now that Pakistan is the source of the 26/11 attacks. So
for China not to acknowledge it the way in which the UK, US, France,
etc, whose leaders visited India, have, is certainly an issue on which
India can feel China is not being sufficiently understanding of India’s
concerns. Then there is China-Pakistan military cooperation. The
Chinese need to understand that the worries that we have had, over the
years, about the American arms, ammunition and technology ultimately
being used up against India is similar to that vis-à-vis China’s
supplies. China’s military cooperation with Pakistan is a potential
source of threat to India’s security -- that is something which the
Chinese need to take on board. That may not mean that China will have
absolutely no military cooperation with Pakistan in the future but they
should pay attention to this aspect if they wish to take into account
our views if the purpose of the India – China strategic and cooperative
partnership for peace and prosperity is to be served. On the issue of
nuclear cooperation, the Chinese need to subject themselves to the same
kind of international discipline that other countries who are committed
to non-proliferation are subjecting themselves to.
If China does not give satisfaction on India’s core concerns, would it
be prudent or feasible to up the ante on issues that are of core
concern to China, such as Tibet?
We haven’t quite come to that stage yet. On the stapled-visa issue, the
Chinese have said during Wen Jiabao’s visit that this is a subject that
can be discussed between the officials on the two sides. But, in the
absence of a political-level direction given to the officials, frankly
it seems to me that it is going to be very difficult for the officials
to find a solution on their own. We have to ask ourselves whether the
absence in this particular joint statement of one-China policy or
Tibet, is anything more than procedural. Maybe there can be a public
debate on this issue: are we willing, are we in a position, does it
serve India’s interests to move from purely procedural, purely tactical
considerations regarding the omission of the one-China reference or
Tibet reference to a substantive, to a strategic position, which is not
in conformity with the one-China position that India has taken in the
past? We’ve not reached that stage, so it is pre-mature, speculative,
as to whether we are willing to take that step.
Should the omission of adherence to a one-China policy in the joint
statement be seen as a diplomatic victory of sorts for India? Did India
get its own way with the Chinese? Did India insist that China accept
J&K as an integral part of India if it wants India to adhere to a one-
China policy?
It is always very wise for diplomats not to declare victory because
diplomatic successes are essentially a compromise. I don’t think
diplomats should speak in terms of victory or defeat. What we should be
looking for is whether the objective that we started with has been
achieved through the process of negotiations, through peaceful means,
that by itself is success insofar as diplomats and diplomacy are
concerned. As of now, if this is the signal that India is sending to
China, that look you are treading on grounds that are rather sensitive
from our point of view, be careful, don’t ignore our concerns, please
pay attention to them, if that is the signal we are sending and that
signal has registered, then we must wait to see what is the result,
outcome of that signal that we have put out. As I said it is a little
premature to talk in terms of what steps we might take tomorrow or the
day-after or one week or one year hence. Maybe there needs to be a
public debate on what is advantageous or disadvantageous from India’s
point of view but we should use whatever leverage we may have earned as
a result of this to see whether we can get a satisfactory resolution of
the issue which has triggered it, which is the issue of stapled visa.
Then we can look at whether we need to go any further, whether having
achieved our purpose it is enough and we don’t need to make any
substantive changes; that is something we can consider some time down
the line.
Even while the border issue is pending, going beyond trade, what are
the areas where India and China can work together so that unpleasant
rivalry or adversariness is reduced?
If, as is being projected, by 2020 or 2025 India and China together
account for one-third of the global GDP, then it does not serve
anybody’s interests, certainly not global interests, certainly not
India’s or China’s interests, that we should be at loggerheads. Clearly
peace and stability would be prerequisites that both sides would be
looking for in order to sustain their developmental efforts. We need to
look upon trade as positive, as something that is good for both sides.
Some observers have turned the border issue into an acid test, a test
of China’s sincerity in wanting to have good relations with India. I
think on the Indian side we must introspect. Has enough been done to
prepare public opinion to arrive at a border settlement which may not
necessarily be 100 per cent of what we are looking for? If a compromise
becomes inevitable if the Chinese don’t voluntarily concede our claims,
have we done enough to prepare public opinion for a compromise? What
happens if we have an agreement and no public support for it? That
would not be advisable. Therefore to make settlement of the boundary
issue to our satisfaction a kind of a litmus test is something we
should be very careful about.
How would you describe the Chinese premier’s visit?
There was no expectation that this visit would lead to any
breakthroughs. That has been borne out. So one thing it certainly
indicates is that the Government and the MEA, in particular, is on the
ball in anticipating what might be the results from the visit. One
can’t expect every single visit to be “historic”.
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